

“RACIAL FRONTIERS IN JAMAICA’S NONRACIAL NATIONHOOD.”

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In the twentieth century many of the postcolonial nations of Africa and Asia amply demonstrated the artificiality of nationhood as constructed largely through the political, social and economic engineering of the former European colonial powers. Colonialism carved out nations from disparate ethnic groups separated by language, religion and traditions. Conversely, it also severed through national boundaries peoples who shared a common ethnicity, language, religion and historical experiences. The follies of such arrogant, arbitrary demarcations, long apparent since the colonial era, contributed in no mean measure to some of the most deadly upheavals of post-independence.¹ In the Caribbean the nations, also constructs of European engineering, from their physical boundaries seemed not so artificial. After all, they conformed to the natural, island, geographical demarcations. Still, however, in reality, they too, are complex amalgams of races and ethnicities, drawn together from the repercussions of slavery, colonialism and migration.

The modern nation of Jamaica is one such amalgam. At independence the population consisted of 76.8% Black, 16.9% Mixed Race, 0.9% White, 0.6% Chinese, 1.7% Indian and 3.1% others.² Although the numerical preponderance of Blacks was glaring, it could not subsume the presence of the other races, whose roles and niches in the society had been firmly carved by the time of independence. In essence, then, the new nation was multiracial. But from the onset, the architects of Jamaica’s nationhood

intended to drastically reduce or obliterate racial consciousness as an essential, defining trait of the nation. This resolve is encapsulated in the motto adopted, “Out of Many, One People.” This was meant to be more than rhetoric. It was to be at the heart of the spirit of an ideology for nationhood. What is this ideology? Who were the proponents and what were their motives? What mitigating factors threaten the literal application of this ideology? What is imagined in this case, a Jamaican non-racial nationhood or the racially defined affinities within its national boundaries? These are questions that frame the analyses in this study.

The ink on the agreement with Britain, the vacating colonial power, had hardly dried when scholars began to analyze and assess the experimental feat of a non-racial nationhood. The complex dynamics of race, ethnic and class relations in Jamaica, and indeed, the whole Caribbean region, have always held a scholarly appeal. Out of the scholarly investigations have emerged numerous definitive works. Although somewhat dated, M.G. Smith’s 1965 study, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* is still a classic. Other notable works include those of David Lowenthal, Adam Kuper, Rupert Lewis, Carl Stone, Derek Gordon and Rex Nettleford.³ These studies, through varying approaches, investigate and assess the evolution of the diverse groups that constitute the Jamaican population, the dynamics of race, ethnic and class relations, and the meanings of nationhood. Therefore, the present study is not an attempt into virgin terrain. Instead, it seeks to contribute to an ongoing discourse on race, identity and nationality in postcolonial Jamaica. I come into this work not as a Caribbeanist but as an immigration historian and scholar and teacher of the African diaspora. Because of this background I intend to enter the discourse by examining Jamaica’s nationhood within three contexts:

the African diaspora, the Afro-Caribbean diaspora and trans-nationalism. This approach will emphasize the agency of blackness in shaping the realities of Jamaica's nationhood. It is instructive to note here, at the outset, that this approach does not deny other racially based influences like Chinese expressions of ethnicity, for example. It singles out Black nationalism because that phenomenon provides the best insights into the enduring racial ramifications of the construction of a Jamaican people.

The premise of this study is that Jamaican nationhood has not proceeded and will not proceed without profound influences from outside currents. Most of these are couched in its long history of slavery, colonialism and migration. These historical realities put Jamaica within a configuration that transcends national boundaries. This entity is one that is defined by a black collectivity born out of the African diaspora and aptly labeled the Black Atlantic by social and cultural historian Paul Gilroy.⁴ According to Gilroy, the Black Atlantic serves as a useful tool for understanding the development of modern black societies. As he put it:

The history of the black Atlantic..., continually crisscrossed by movements of black people – not only as commodities but engaged in various struggles towards emancipation, autonomy, and citizenship—provides a means to reexamine the problems of nationality, location, identity, and historical memory.⁵

The Afro-Caribbean diaspora has served to reinforce the sense of global blackness already established by the African diaspora. In other words, the Afro-Caribbean diaspora, though a more modern phenomenon, like the African diaspora, is one of the underpinnings of the Black Atlantic. The crisscrossing within the Black Atlantic underscores the process of transnationalism, a major ingredient of the Afro-Caribbean diaspora. Roy Simon Bryce-Laporte, one of the authorities of the Caribbean diaspora,

emphasizes that migrations are not simple processes that divide people of African descent. On the contrary, they serve as a unifying force.⁶ They profoundly affect not only those emigrants who physically leave the homeland but also those who remain and the society in general. Through the crisscrossing, the migration process directly and indirectly alters and shapes the institutions of both the sending and receiving societies. Jamaican immigrants and their descendants, whose experiences in their new locations in the Black Atlantic, among other things, “ethnicize” and “racialize” them, continue to influence numerous aspects in their homeland, including the meanings and expressions of nationhood.

Jamaica’s national ideology has been dissected and analyzed by numerous scholars, whose works are available for further referencing.⁷ Here I will only state its main thrust. It acknowledges the multiplicity of the new nation’s racial and ethnic composition. But the crux of the Jamaican ideology is, as Milton Vickerman emphasizes, how “the ideology of multiracialism verges into one of nonracialism.”⁸ According to this rationale, the various groups, though many and diverse, co-existed amicably enough to render racial factors irrelevant. Who are these racial/ethnic groups? At independence did they really co-exist amicably? In other words, what are the pre-independence antecedents of race relations?

The story of race relations in Jamaica, as in other parts of the Caribbean, began with genocide. The invading Europeans wiped out the indigenous inhabitants, the Taino “Indians.”⁹ On the heels of genocide came slavery, with the introduction of Africans. The “two Jamaicas,” “White and Black,” began to emerge during the Spanish colonial era. English White Jamaica, as a distinct European variant, began with the British take over of

Jamaica in 1655. The British colonial government inherited a Black population of 1500, which it consciously and steadily increased to sustain its plantocracy. People of African descent rose from $\frac{1}{10}$ of the total population under the Spanish regime to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the population by emancipation in 1833.¹⁰ The evolution of this most distinct segment of the population is couched in the painful and complex history of slavery and resistance, too rich to recount here. Most germane to this discussion is the creation by emancipation of a Jamaican Black ethnicity. The Africans brought to the island were vastly diverse, from Yoruba to Asante to Fon to Bantu. But within a context of racial oppression, from this highly pluralistic composition was born a black ethnicity, a situation not quite unlike that of other regions of the diaspora.¹¹

This black ethnicity had been well established when an Asian presence was infused into the black-white Jamaican society. After emancipation blacks moved en masse as far away as possible from the plantations, the most enduring reminder of bondage. In the search for an alternate source of cheap labor, the colonial government set its sights on India and China after efforts directed at Europe, North America and Africa failed.¹² Between 1845 and 1914, about 36,400 East Indians were brought to Jamaica under the indentureship program agreed upon by both the colonial governments of Jamaica and India. Although theoretically, both governments agreed to ensure the fair treatment of the workers, the evidence reveals that most of the Indian families could only get deplorable housing and worked under exploitative employment conditions.¹³ In spite of these difficulties and the repatriation provisions built into the agreement, the East Indians did form a permanent community on the island. Their “alien” religions (80% Hindu and 20% Muslim) along with their initial inability to understand English set them

apart. The colonial government, for its part, exploited the situation, pursuing deliberate policies designed to segregate the Indians from the Africans. This, of course, was principally to forestall any concerted Indian-African resistance.¹⁴ The African-Jamaicans often displayed the same contempt of white Jamaicans for the Indians. Additionally, they resented those Indians who succeeded and, therefore, threatened their place in the economy. The Indians, for their part, quickly grasped the established racial stratification, which put blacks at the bottom. Moreover, as Sherlock and Bennet point out in *The Story of the Jamaican People*, the Indians' fixed caste system in which skin pigmentation partly determined social status, caused them to view the darker complexioned African-Jamaicans as socially inferior. Some of them openly referred to Blacks as Kafari or infidel. Even into the 20th century some Indians would not allow their children to attend the same schools with black children.¹⁵

The Chinese, the other Asian post-emancipation immigrant group, came a little later than the Indians. The first waves of Chinese migration to Jamaica in the second half of the 19th century occurred within a wider context of a Chinese diaspora, which also took them to other destinations, including Brazil and the United States. The first arrival came via Panama, where they had been recruited to help construct the railroad. Almost 500 Chinese laborers, who were fairing badly under the harsh Panama conditions, were exchanged for Jamaican labor. As shortages of Black labor on the plantations continued and Indian labor also began to prove unreliable, successive waves of Chinese immigrants were welcomed. These immigrants were farmers, originally from Kang Tung province in South East China. They did not come directly from there, however, as they were recruited from Hong Kong, Trinidad and British Guiana. Chinese immigration to Jamaica

continued into the twentieth century, by which time the established Chinese Jamaicans were beginning to send for relatives through a discernable chain migration process.

Like the Indians, the Chinese experienced tremendous hardships. As a non-English speaking, non-Christian group, they faced similar contempt and bigotry. Although the majority of the migrants were farmers, in Jamaica, once they fulfilled their contracts they moved out of the estates and from agriculture. Many found their niche in the grocery retail business. They were so successful in this economic arena that by 1910, “grocery store” and “Chinese shop” had become synonymous.¹⁶ This success elicited resentment from other groups in the society. This resentment was violently demonstrated in the labor riots of the 1930s, when some of the protesters attacked some Chinese and destroyed their property. The colonial government, too, partial to the interests of the white economic elite, resorted to policies aimed at restricting the entry of Chinese immigrants and monitoring the activities of those already resident on the island. Reaction to official and unofficial discrimination contributed to the building of a viable and permanent Chinese-Jamaican community. Since they had no consular representation on the island, the Chinese built their own institutional support through benevolent, mutual benefit associations and “wee chen” (rotating credit association), a transplanted financial support system. Partly through these reactive processes, the Jamaican Chinese were able to sustain a distinct community in spite of their relatively small number.¹⁷

Also present in the racial/ethnic tapestry was the Middle East. The Jewish presence actually began in the Spanish colonial era. Jews first arrived as indentured servants who helped to establish the sugar industry. In spite of initial discrimination against them as a non-Christian group, they made phenomenal progress, moving from the

plantations into commerce. As prosperous merchants they came to exert a strong control over the Jamaican economy. This put them on a par with the privileged white planters who were known to seek financial help from Jewish enterprises.¹⁸ The other groups from the Middle East, Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians (collectively more commonly referred to simply as ‘Syrians’), followed similar economic paths, moving their way up from peddlers to merchants and traders.¹⁹

So, by independence, there were the “two Jamaicas,” “Black and White” and in the middle were the immigrant minority groups of East Indians, Chinese, Jews and “Syrians.” Because of this intermediary position, these groups have also been labeled “Middleman Minorities.”²⁰ Undeniably, then, Jamaica’s racial pluralism was clearly established by the late 1930s, when the struggle for self-government and independence got underway. Was there a sense of community, of peoplehood in spite of this pluralism? Historian Edward Braithwaite advanced his thesis of Creolism as support for the existence of such a unified community. According to him, a Creole society that was neither European nor African had emerged by the 19th century, giving the black, white and colored inhabitants of the island a sense of being distinctly Jamaican.²¹ But reviewers of Braithwaite’s interpretation point out that it is improbable, under the existing acrimonious relations, that slave and master shared common values that could be channeled into forging a sense of being one people. Indeed, the planters often appealed to the island’s distinct culture, but specifically in their struggles with England. Therefore, as Gordon Lewis points out, the “Jamaican sense,” was opportunism rather than real Creole patriotism and it remained an ideology of narrow interest.²²

Creolization, in its simplest sense of mere mixing of diverse peoples, intensified in the 19th century and early 20th century with the arrival of the non-white, non-black groups. While Creolization manifested itself clearly in some of the evolving hybrid cultural forms, sharp distinction of the various racial groups persisted.²³ So, at independence, the attempt to foster a “one people” national ideology was not uncalled for. Such an ideology was essentially to serve as a tool of conflict control. Like everywhere else, the Jamaican “nationalizing elites” were inventing nation and national tradition. Unlike in the new African nations, the two party system which evolved in Jamaica was not fiercely reflective of cultural affinities. The dominant parties, the People’s National Party and the Jamaican Labor Party, essentially transcend race, color and class in their membership, leadership and agenda. Furthermore, as many Jamaicans, most especially the nation-building elites, are quick to point out, since independence questions of race have seldom been raised explicitly in Jamaican politics.²⁴ This is seen as a major indicator of the viability, actually the success, of the national ideology. Thus, it would seem that the inventors of the Jamaican nation have successfully created a non-racial framework for nationhood. But how unqualified is this success? While it is true that only a few times have questions of race surfaced explicitly in post-colonial Jamaican politics, the fact that they are asked at all reveal salient racial fractures. The impingement of race on Jamaica as a non-racial invention will always be a factor because the African diaspora, the Afro-Caribbean diaspora and transnationalism aggregately have created black collectivity as a rival framework for understanding nationhood.

The salience of black collectivity goes all the way back to the era of slavery. While there are many indices for this, perhaps the most pointed is the Maroon factor. A

community of runaway slaves, Jamaica's Maroons, even though eventually "defeated" by the British colonial government, demonstrated the workings of a black community within a larger white-dominated entity.²⁵ According to John Henrik Clarke, renowned scholar of the African diaspora, the Maroons must be recognized as pioneers of black nationalism in the African diaspora.²⁶ Indeed, 20th century black nationalist movements have tapped into the legacy of the Maroons to formulate their ideologies and strategies. One such beneficiary is Rastafarianism which emerged in Jamaica in the 1930s. The movement was inspired by the pan-African efforts to rescue Ethiopia from the devastating Italian imperialistic assault. The Jamaican supporters of the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, also known as Ras Tafari, built a whole movement around their support for Ethiopia, which quickly came to include their counter assault on a more universal domination of black people. This movement became clearly recognizable through its name, Rastafarianism, the adherents, Rastafarians or Rastas, their physical appearance, especially their dreadlock, hair and their music, reggae.²⁷ While too often critics emphasize distinguishing traits like ganja smoking to dismiss Rastafarianism, it is in fact one major expression of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism itself is a product of the African diaspora and for the purposes of this essay, I must stress, is one of the forces that contribute to the rival framework that threatens the literal application of Jamaican non-racial nationhood.

Marronage, Rastafarianism and, certainly not to be omitted, Garveyism²⁸ are all antecedents of postcolonial black nationalism. The unrest of the 1960s, almost immediately after independence, provided the first glimpse into the enduring viability of race consciousness. The short-lived People's Political Party, led by Black lawyer Millard

Johnson, presented the first significant attempt to incorporate Black protest into Jamaican postcolonial politics. Together with Rastas of the urban areas the PPP protested the economic closure experienced by blacks; the dominance of the economy and society by whites and ethnic minorities; it advocated black ethnic nationalism; and actually advanced the idea of black supremacy.²⁹ The PPP did not survive in the political arena; not surprising, since its main support base, the rastas, boycotted elections, which they branded Babylon politics.

The demise of the PPP did not mean the end of a black indictment of a non-racial Jamaica. The Black Power Movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s underscored the continuation of black nationalism. Black Power adherents focused substantially on the nation's economy by vigorously denouncing the workings of the major sectors – bauxite alumina and tourist industries. These were controlled by huge multinational companies which were mostly North American – Canada and the U.S. So, on one level, significantly, the Black Power Movement was an anti-imperialist movement aimed at neo-colonial forces. As Jamaican scholar Rex Nettleford explained:

...Many Jamaicans see this [bauxite-alumina industry] as the colonial industry par excellence, controlled as it is from multinational bases situated outside of the country. They know that decision-making does not rest with Jamaicans and seldom with white functionaries who reside on the island.³⁰

But the Black Power Movement was more than a Jamaican nativist movement against foreign exploiters. Even as they pounded on foreign elements, Black Power protesters saw the racial implications within the Jamaican economy. Simply put, according to Nettleford, “the Jamaican economy did not live up to the expectations of an ex-slave society struggling to give full meaning to emancipation and freedom.”³¹ From

this perspective, the Black Power Movement vented some of its most vehement resentment at the very internal economic structure of the non-racial nation. At the height of the movement the protesters released a pamphlet attempting to show “intensified white economic power in Jamaica.” The list included over one hundred commercial businesses controlled by white families. The term white is used loosely here. As Carl Stone points out, by the time of the Black Power Movement “dominant economic power had shifted from the [white] rural-based planter class to the urban-based intermediary ethnic groups (Jews, Syrians, Chinese and Browns), who reconstituted a new and powerful capitalism which included the whites but eliminated the latter’s ascendancy and dominance.”³² The Black Power Movement begged serious questions about non-white ethnic minorities, including “should their property be expropriated so as to accommodate control by the 90-odd per cent black Jamaicans?”³³ While nothing so drastic ever materialized, Black Power adherents made it clear that their attack of the economy did not stop at foreign exploiters. For emancipation and independence to be realistically meaningful, blacks must exert economic as well as political control.

If the economic targets of Black Power did not denote black nationalism clearly, its adherents and their strategies screamed blackness. In the forefront were rastas, neo-Garveyites and return migrants who were mostly young radical intellectuals embittered by racism in Canada, U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. Their composition and rhetoric clearly revealed the workings of pan-Africanism and transnationalism born out of both the African and Afro-Caribbean diasporas. Rasta and reggae icon Peter Tosh underscored the premise of Black Power in one of his hits: “No matter where you come from, as long as you are a Blackman you are an African. No matter your nationality you have got the

identity of an African.” According to this premise, blacks of Jamaica are strongly connected to blacks elsewhere in the diaspora and Africa. Clearly, then, such reasoning upheld the salience of race and underscored the impracticality of a truly non-racial nation.

Along with the racially charged reggae lyrics were attempts at aesthetic re-Africanization. Black Power supporters in Jamaica began to wear the dashiki and the big Afro hairstyle almost rivaled dreadlocks as a symbol of blackness. These trends, undoubtedly, were imported from the United States where the Black Power Movement had started earlier. As was the case in the United States, the efficacy of such aesthetic Africanization became a subject of debate. For example, a letter to the editor of the *Jamaica Daily Gleaner* of June 7, 1969 called such trends “black stupidity.” A letter responding to this attack explained: “Wearing an African dress is a silent and dignified statement by a Jamaican of African origin that he belongs to one of the clearly defined, and I should like to think, great races of the world.” (*Daily Gleaner*, June 16, 1969). The *Gleaner* also reprinted an article by Kenyan activist Tom Mboya, which had first appeared in the *New York Times*. Entitled “Back to Africa Desire Unrealistic,” Mboya questioned the usefulness of black diasporic protest which, not fully understanding Africa and Africans, delved indiscriminately into various aspects of “African culture” in search of support. It is because of this kind of concern that some black power advocates pressed for a meaningful study of African history. Convinced that collective memory was an essential tool for sustaining black collectivity, they stressed the necessity of learning “good African history.” But even this more laudable form of re-Africanization provoked questions, the major one being, “would African history subsume West Indian, Jamaican history? The firing of Walter Rodney, Guyanese historian and self-proclaimed Marxist,

hired to teach African history at the University in Mona, Kingston, is emblematic of the tension. Aesthetic or intellectual, Africanization propagated black nationalism and threatened Jamaican nationalism.

Again, as was the case in the United States, Black Power as a movement in Jamaica waned. But it would be erroneous to conclude that Jamaican non-racial nationhood triumphed. Transnationalism within the Afro-Caribbean diaspora would continue to interplay with pan-Africanism and loom over non-racialism. The Afro-Caribbean diaspora has resulted in transplanted Afro-Caribbean communities mostly in three areas of the Black Atlantic, namely, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. These communities, far from being detached, are closely linked through the crisscrossing of people and ideas. The carnival provides a good example of the basis for interaction. Increasingly, West Indians, including Jamaicans, view the annual carnival in New York, Toronto and London as significant points of contact. These celebrations, which are clearly far more than entertainment and merriment, provide insights into the evolution of the politics of diasporic nationalism. In all these connecting points in the Black Atlantic, the experiences of the Jamaicans abroad are shaped in no small measure by their encounters with race and racism: in the United States, from racial profiling, which goes as far as singling out “Jamaican posses,” to police brutality against blacks; in the United Kingdom, from increasing racial residential segregation to widespread racism in the police force; and in Multicultural Canada, from the insidious practice of arbitrarily streamlining Black students into lower standard classes and programs to “police racism.”³⁴ Black Jamaicans abroad, invariably then, have to deal with their blackness. And because of the ongoing transnational connections within the Black Atlantic, the

discourses engendered are transmitted across national boundaries, including those of the homeland, Jamaica. As Paul Gilroy describes it in his study of Blacks in Britain, culture develops in “complex, dynamic patters of syncretism in which new definitions of what it means to be black emerge from raw materials provided by black populations elsewhere in the diaspora.”³⁵

Indeed, culture is a crucial underpinning of this black diasporic nationalism. At the turn of the 20th century, music still featured as a prominent conduit that funneled black identity into the parameters of a Jamaican non-racial nation. While reggae continues to be prominent, with the new breed of second-generation rastas still “chanting Babylon,” hip-hop artists are making a rapid ascent as the cultural black nationalists of the 21st century. Significantly, hip-hop owes some of its beginnings to the Giant Speaker Sound system of the Jamaican immigrant community of the Bronx in the late 1960s and early 1970s.³⁶ Fundamentally, the message of both reggae and hip-hop is collective consciousness. Therefore, whether to celebrate the life of late reggae icon Bob Marley or to film a hip-hop music video in Moore Town, a historically renowned Maroon territory, the artists, blast their racial ideology. Usually, their audiences are big, filling soccer stadiums and other such arenas. Interestingly, while many in the crowd would uphold one official standard and vigorously deny the salience of race in their nation, they find a comfort zone at these events, where they equally affirm a cultural black nationalism, believing perhaps that this did amount to a coup against political, non racial, Jamaican nationalism.

While blackness is fundamental to diasporic nationalism, it does not negate nation or nationality. Interestingly, black immigrants invoke their national affiliations to counter

racism in their new homes. So, almost simultaneously as they grapple with what it means to be black in the United States, Canada or the United Kingdom, they also attempt to articulate non-racial identities based mostly on nationality. The Jamaican community in New York exemplifies this trend. By the 1980s, this group had come up with a label that denoted their transnationality—Jamericans. Like all their other identities, this is also situational, for there are situations where they are Black or West Indian.

The foregoing analysis, still a work in progress, reveals certain realities and provokes certain questions. It reveals that there are persistent racial contours in postcolonial Jamaica. It reveals that these are sustained by both internal and external forces. It reveals that the external forces must be understood within the dynamics of black diasporic nationalism. But it also asks, what will this black diasporic nationalism do to Jamaica? Will it ultimately render it a truly “black society?” Or will it contribute towards understanding Jamaica in two realms—political affinities and cultural affinities? In that case, will Jamaica be non-racial in its democratic, political traditions and black, white, Indian, Chinese and Syrian in its cultural traditions?

¹ The examples are legion, from military coups to secessions which culminated in deadly, protracted civil wars. In Africa there are a host of examples, from the Biafra war in Nigeria to the Rwanda and Burundi genocide. In Asia, the vicissitudes of the subcontinent, including the unending struggle over Kashmir, are exemplary.

² Colin Clarke, *Kingston, Jamaica: Urban Development and Social Change 1692-1962* (Berkeley: California Press, 1975), 152.

³ M.G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); David Lowenthal, *West Indian Societies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Adam Kuper, *Changing Jamaica* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Rupert Lewis, “Black Nationalism in Jamaica in Recent Years,” in Carl Stone and Aggrey Brown eds., *Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica* (Kingston:

Jamaica Publishing House, 1977); Derek Gordon, "Race, Class and Social Mobility in Jamaica," in Rupert Lewis and Patrick Bryan eds., *Garvey: His Work and Impact* (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1991); Rex Nettleford, "Race, Identity and Independence on Jamaica," in Hilary Beckles and Verene Shepherd eds., *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to Present* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1993).

⁴ Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Roy Simon Bryce Laporte, in the Introduction of Aubrey W. Bonnet and G. Llewellyn Watson, eds., *Emerging Perspectives of the Black Diaspora* (New York: University Press of America, 1990).

⁷ See for example, Kathleen Norris, *Jamaica: the Search for an Identity* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Nyamayro K. Mufuka, "The Jamaican Experiment," *Current History*, Vol. 74, No. 434 (1978); Rex Nettleford, *Identity, Race and Protest in Jamaica* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1972); and Anthony Payne, "Jamaica's Approach to Independence," *Caribbean Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (1988).

⁸ Milton Vickerman, *Crosscurrents: West Indian Immigrants and Race* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 37.

⁹ For more on the indigenous peoples and their extermination, see Irving Rowe, *The Tainos: Rise and Decline of the People Who Greeted Columbus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

¹⁰ Philip Sherlock and Hazel Bennett, *The Story of the Jamaican People* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1998), 77; G.W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 65.

¹¹ For more on the dynamics of the evolution of a black ethnicity in Jamaica, see Don Robotham, "The Development of a Black Ethnicity in Jamaica," in Rupert Lewis and Patrick Bryan, eds., *Garvey: His Work and Impact*, 23-38.

¹² Soon after emancipation the government recruited indentured servants from Germany, Scotland, England and Ireland. This policy, the government hoped, would serve the dual purpose of providing labor and balancing the ratio between black and white. However, a number of factors, including anti-emigration sentiments in Europe, the white workers' disdain of plantation work, tropical diseases, and the lure of other destinations like the United States, put an end to the project.

Although between 1841 and 1867 thousands of Africans were recruited from Sierra

Leone, West Africa, the African alternative was abandoned because it was unpopular, especially in Britain, where the Colonial Office feared that it could be seen as a continuation of African enslavement.

¹³ See H.S. Sohal, "The East Indian Indenturship System in Jamaica 1845-1917," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Waterloo, 1979.

¹⁴ Sherlock and Bennet, *The Story of the Jamaican People*, 321.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ For more on the Chinese and the grocery trade in Jamaica, see Jacqueline Levy, "The Economic Role of the Chinese in Jamaica: The Grocery Retail Trade," *The Jamaican Historical Review*, Vol. 15, 1986.

¹⁷ For more on the evolution of the Jamaican Chinese community, see Lee Tom Yin, *The Chinese in Jamaica* (Kingston: 1963).

¹⁸ For more on the history of Jews in Jamaica, see Stephan Alexander Fortune, *Merchants and Jews: The Struggle for British West Indian Commerce, 1650-1750* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984); C.S. Holzberg, *Minorities and Power in a Black Society: The Jewish Community of Jamaica* (Maryland: N.S. Publishing Co., 1987).

¹⁹ See David Nicholls, "The Syrians of Jamaica," *The Jamaican Historical Review* Vol. 15 (1986).

²⁰ One of the classic analyses of this phenomenon is Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Middleman Minorities," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 38 (1973).

²¹ Edward Braithwaite, *The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

²² Gordon K. Lewis, *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought: The Historical Evolution of Caribbean Society in its Ideological Aspects, 1492-1900* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 321-322.

²³ By the 1950s, many of the festivals and celebrations demonstrated the cultural creolization that had occurred, for example, the hosay and divali Hindu festivals and the Chinese Lion dance and prominence of fireworks in celebrations.

²⁴ For example, Norman Manley, one of the architects of the nation, declared that "nowhere in the world has more progress been made in developing a non-racial society in which colour is not significant." Cited in Sherlock and Bennett, *Story of the Jamaican People*, 386.

²⁵ Jamaica, like Guyana, Surinam and Brazil, has a rich history of marronage as a form of slave rebellion. A good study of Jamaica's Maroons is Mavis Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal* (Granby, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1990).

²⁶ John Henrik Clarke, "The Caribbean Antecedents of Marcus Garvey," in John Henrik Clarke, ed., *Marcus Garvey and the Vision for Africa* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 23.

²⁷ For more on the history of Rastafarianism (from the perspective of a Rasta), see Bones Jah, *One Love: Rastafari History, Doctrine and Livivity* (London: Voice of Rasta Publishing House, 1989). For a more objective view, see Joseph Owens, *Dread: The Rastafarians of Jamaica* (Exeter, N.H.: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976).

²⁸ Jamaican Marcus Garvey was an internationally known black nationalist. His Universal Negro Improvement Association, which he first formed in Jamaica in 1916, spread to other parts of the Caribbean, South America, Africa and the United States, where he moved the headquarters in 1918. Though highly controversial, few deny his lasting impact on pan-Africanism and Black nationalism.

²⁹ Carl Stone, "Race and Economic Power in Jamaica," in Lewis and Bryan, eds., *Garvey*, 251-252.

³⁰ Rex Nettleford, "Race, Identity and Independence in Jamaica," in Hilary Beckles and Verene Shepherd, eds., *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996), 521.

³¹ *Ibid*, 520.

³² Stone, "Race and Economic Power in Jamaica," 251.

³³ Nettleford, "Race, Identity and Independence," 519.

³⁴ In May 1990, for example, an amalgamation of Black organizations issued a protest document entitled "The Precarious Situation of Blacks in Ontario."

³⁵ Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 13.

³⁶ Werner Zips, *Black Rebels: African Caribbean Freedom Fighters in Jamaica* (Princeton, Markus Wiener, 1999), 220.