

WHITE INTO BLACK
Race and National Identity in Contemporary Brazil¹

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The Issue

Brazil's image as a racial democracy originates largely in the nation's long history of pervasive racial and cultural blending and the validation of this process by differentiating its population into Whites (brancos), multiracial individuals (pardos), and Blacks (pretos). In addition, there has been a conspicuous absence of legalized barriers to racial equality in both the public and private spheres as well as a notable fluidity in racial markers. Consequently, it has been argued that class and culture determine one's status in the social hierarchy. On the other hand, in the United States, race has been viewed as the primary factor determining social inequality. Furthermore, the social construction of racial categories and boundaries is premised on the rule of hypodescent (the one-drop rule) that designates as Black everyone of African descent. European Americans not only have used this device as part of the strategy for preserving their cultural and racial "purity," but also as a means of maintaining their dominant status. The one-drop rule has thus served as the underpinning of both legal and informal barriers preventing Blacks from having contact with Whites as equals in most aspects of social life. This has encompassed public facilities, and other areas of the public and private spheres, particularly the area of miscegenation. At the turn of the twentieth century, these restrictions reached drastic proportions with the institutionalization of Jim Crow segregation.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Brazil's reputation as a racial democracy was tarnished by the weight of massive data compiled by social scientists. However, further discussion on the problem of racial inequality was prohibited during the two decades of military rule (1964–1985) by claims that no such problem existed. With the gradual return of civilian rule in the 1970s, the public and political debate on racial inequality was reopened in 1978 with the founding of the Unified Black Movement (O Movimento Negro Unificado). Activists were bolstered by a new generation of social scientists whose findings

supported their claims that the divide between the privileged few and the less privileged masses coincides respectively with the racial divide between *brancos* and *negros*, and only secondarily between *pardos* and *pretos*. In addition, a multiracial identification brings with it the expectation, though not the automatic, achievement of increased social rewards, and a concomitant rejection of any association with being African Brazilian in order to escape the social stigma attached to Blackness. Consequently, one of the Black consciousness movement's goals has been to achieve unity in the struggle against this racial inequality by getting Black and particularly multiracial individuals to assume an identity as African Brazilian.

In the spring of 1988, the Black consciousness movement sought to further its goals during the centennial of the abolition of slavery in Brazil by organizing mass public demonstrations against racial discrimination. By the 1990s, the debate in Brazil had also crystallized around changing procedures for collecting and reporting official data on race—particularly on the decennial census. The goal has been to replace the distinct color categories of *preto* and *pardo* with the single racial category of *negro*. The net result of these new trends has been to move Brazilian race relations toward a greater emphasis on the *negro/branco* (or Black/White) dichotomy, if not the strict enforcement of the one-drop rule of hypodescent. Also, the public and political debate has increasingly included discussions about the importance of race, quite apart from questions of class and cultural, in determining social stratification.

Prior to the emergence of the Black consciousness movement in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s, pervasive miscegenation and the “mulatto escape hatch,” combined with the fact that Brazil has never known anything comparable to Jim Crow segregation, had helped to perpetuate the myth of racial democracy. This national schizophrenia and amnesia had, generally speaking, deflected attention away from racism, and had impeded the political mobilization of individuals of African descent, since inequality and, by extension, prejudice and discrimination were said to be based primarily on culture and class. During the 1970s, the myth of racial democracy began to erode in Brazil. The Black Consciousness Movement in

Brazil began challenging the ternary model of race relations. Part of its strategy was to get more multiracial individuals to identify themselves as Black rather than multiracial.

This chapter examines these phenomena within the historical context of Brazilian race relations and the formation of Brazilian national identity as they relate to several important questions. For example, what impact might these changes have on the social construction of “Whiteness” and “Blackness” in Brazil and Brazil’s national identity? Also, to what extent might the deconstruction of traditional racial categories and boundaries in Brazil undermine racist ideology and racial privilege? While the answers to these questions will enhance understanding of similar trends among other groups, they have significant implications for Black-White relations, and make a historical analysis of that dynamic particularly meaningful, by virtue of the history of African slavery and the unique legacy of attitudes and policies that have crystallized around individuals of African descent in the formation of Brazil’s national identity.

Research Trends and Implications

Brazil’s reputation as a racial democracy can be attributed in part to Gilberto Freyre’s monumental study of Brazilian race relations (*The Masters and the Slaves*, 1963; *The Mansions and the Shanties*, 1963; *Order and Progress*, 1970). However, that image was somewhat discredited when data compiled in the 1950s by both Brazilian and foreign scholars showed that physical appearance, working in conjunction with class and cultural factors, had a significant impact on social inequality despite the lack of legalized barriers to equality in Brazil. Notwithstanding the contradiction between the myth and reality of Brazil’s racial democracy, those findings, along with research conducted in the 1970s (e.g. C. Degler’s *Neither Black nor White*, 1971; T. Skidmore’s *Black into White*, 1974), showed that Brazilian race relations display a notable fluidity in racial markers. This, in turn, has given rise to a window of opportunity that Degler calls the “mulatto escape hatch” which makes it possible for a select few “visibly” multiracial individuals, for reasons of talent, culture, or education, to gain entry into the middle class and with it the rank of situational “Whiteness” in accordance with their approximation to European

phenotypical and cultural traits. More important, this mechanism has made it possible for other millions of individuals whose ancestry has included African forbearers, but who are phenotypically White, or near-White, to become officially, White.

This aspect of the escape hatch clearly sets apart the Brazilian racial order from that in the United States, where the one-drop rule can transform into Black an individual who appears otherwise White. In addition, the one-drop rule has become such an accepted part of the American fabric that most individuals, except perhaps African Americans, are unaware that this device is unique to the United States and specifically applied to Americans of African descent. (The rule of hypodescent has been variously extended to other Americans whose blended lineage includes a “background of color,” along with European ancestry, generally speaking, however, these individuals are not invariably designated exclusively, or even partially, as members of that group of color if the background is less than one-fourth of their lineage. Furthermore, self-identification with that background is more a matter of choice. The one-drop rule of hypodescent, however, in application to African descent, precludes any notion of choice in self-identification.)

In Brazil, the liberalization of the political ecology during the 1970s, in conjunction with the growing racial tension in Brazil, set the stage for the formation of the Black consciousness movement. Activists not only reopened the debate on the question of racial inequality, but, in fact, challenged the notion that social stratification is determined primarily by socioeconomic and cultural criteria that are potentially subject to alteration in one’s lifetime through personal achievement. They argued, rather, that social inequality is largely determined by ascribed, and thus essentially immutable, characteristics such as race. The illusion of racial democracy is maintained, however, by the fact that a few token multiracial individuals (and some rare Blacks) have gained entry into the middle class in accordance with their approximation to European phenotypical and/or cultural traits, while the African Brazilian masses are retained on the periphery of society in the manner of de facto, if not de jure, apartheid.

These assertions were bolstered by the support of social scientists that provided a rigorous analysis of official data contained in such sources as the censuses of 1940, 1950, and 1980, and the National Household Surveys of the 1970s and 1980s, which documented the glaring disparities between Whites and African Brazilians in terms of health, income, and education. These data do indicate that the socioeconomic status of the multiracial population is intermediate to Blacks and Whites and that rates of intermarriage and residential integration among Whites and multiracial individuals are comparatively higher than between Whites and Blacks. Nevertheless, the overall social position of the multiracial population is much closer to that of Blacks than to the Whites. The last several decades have seen the emergence of further analyses of race relations in Brazil that support these findings.

This chapter provides this analysis and also examines the Black consciousness movements as part of the ongoing sociohistorical process of racial formation, as outlined by sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant's *Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to 1990s* (1994). Drawing on this racial formation theory, I propose the Black consciousness movement is a racial "project," in that it simultaneously cultural and political initiatives that seek to "close the escape hatch" by contracting the boundaries of racial Whiteness and expanding those of racial Blackness in order to bring about social structural change. Their cultural initiatives are an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics by means of identity politics, and their political initiatives share among other things are most evident in appeals for changes in official racial classifications, as in the census, and the collection of racial data, challenging institutions, policies, conditions, and rules directly and indirectly based respectively on the mulatto escape hatch.

Neither Black Nor White: The Brazilian Racial Order

The Origin of the Ternary Racial Project

Traditionally, the Brazilian racial order has been contrasted with that in the United States in terms of its long history of pervasive racial (phenotypical, ancestral) and cultural (beliefs, values, customs,

artifacts) blending. Furthermore, Brazil has validated this process by implementing a ternary model of race relations that differentiates its population into European Brazilians (brancos), multiracial individuals (pardos), and Blacks (pretos).² This has led to a notable fluidity in racial/cultural markers, which have made the line between Black and White imprecise at best. This has been accompanied by the absence of legalized barriers to equality in both the public and private spheres. Correspondingly, it has been argued that class and cultural, rather than racial, signifiers have come to determine one's identity and status in the social hierarchy.³

By virtue of this dynamic, select multiracial individuals have historically been allowed token vertical socioeconomic mobility into the bourgeoisie through an informal window of opportunity that historian Carl Degler calls the "escape hatch."⁴ Degler does not imply, as many have argued, that the masses of mulattoes in Brazil gain access *carte blanche* to these prestigious ranks of Whites by virtue of the fact that they are mulatto as opposed to Black. Rather, his central argument is that the escape hatch is an informal social mechanism by which a few "visibly" multiracial individuals, for reasons of talent, culture, or education, have been granted the rank of situational Whiteness in accordance with their phenotypical and cultural approximation to the dominant Whites. More important, this phenomenon has made it possible over time for other millions of individuals whose ancestry has included African forbears, but who are phenotypically White, or near-White, to become officially, White.⁵

Brazil's racial democracy stands out in stark contrast to United States racial order. European Americans, as part of the strategy for preserving not only their cultural and racial "purity" but also their dominant status, have relegated multiracial individuals to the subordinate caste by designating everyone of African descent as Black. Furthermore, this binary racial project has served as the underpinning for a generalized system of both legal and informal exclusion of individuals of African descent from having contact with Whites as equals. This has encompassed public facilities, and other areas of the public or secondary structural sphere (political, economic, educational) as well as the private, or primary structural

sphere (residential, associational, interpersonal), particularly the area of miscegenation. At the turn of the twentieth century, these restrictions reached drastic proportions with the institutionalization of Jim Crow segregation.

These dynamics indicate that the multiracial population in Brazil has occupied an intermediate position in the racial hierarchy, and that the social construction of Whiteness—as well as the extension of White racial privilege—is more inclusive as compared to the United States. Yet, the social positioning of those individuals designated as “multiracial” collectively speaking is much closer to the subordinate Blacks than to that of the dominant Whites. Accordingly, the primary racial divide in terms of the distribution of wealth, power, privilege, and prestige in Brazil is between Whites and all “Others”—as is the case in the United States—and only secondarily between the Black and multiracial populations.

In Brazil, where Whites were greatly outnumbered by Blacks from early in the colonial era to well into the nineteenth century, multiracial individuals occupied an intermediate position in the social structure. Mulatto slave offspring were often assigned tasks that symbolized greater personal worth and required greater skill (e.g., domestics and artisans). The scarcity of White women mitigated opposition from the legal wife and enhanced the likelihood that these offspring would be the recipients of socially tolerated demonstrations of affection, as well as economic and educational protection. Furthermore, mulattoes were given preferential liberation over Blacks, who overwhelmingly were slaves. This made it possible for them in the early colonial period to enter the free classes where they filled interstitial roles in the economy—particularly in the artisanal and skilled trades—due to a shortage of European labor and for which the use of slave labor was considered impractical.

Free Colored urban artisans, long before abolition, advanced from these interstitial positions into the arts, letters, and liberal professions (including medicine, engineering, law, and the civil service), although they were barred from holding public office, entering high status occupations in the clergy and governmental bureaucracy, experienced limitations on educational attainment, and were denied equal

rights in a variety of categories. In addition, Free Coloreds did not achieve vertical mobility through direct competition in the open market, but rather through the support of patrons in the White elite who always controlled their advancement. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that these mulattoes feared that the end of slavery would threaten their position in the labor market. Thus, they were reluctant to oppose slavery, tended to eschew all forms of alliance with slaves, and proved to be valuable allies in preserving the racial order.

So reliable were mulattoes that the distant Portuguese monarchs viewed Free Colored militia as a balance wheel against independence-minded Whites. Both the Portuguese Crown and Brazilian slaveholders, as early as the seventeenth century, relied on the Free Coloreds to help expel Dutch invaders and thus secure Brazil's territorial borders against foreign interlopers. The planter class also utilized their services in local militia as a means of protecting their property, and in the suppression of slave uprisings, as well as the capturing and returning of fugitive slaves. European Brazilians, by granting mulattoes a social location superior to that of Blacks and Native Americans, but significantly inferior to that of Whites, won their loyalty in efforts to exclude Blacks and Native Americans from power without at the same time undermining White domination and control. The process of abolition signed and sealed this racial contract and made it possible for Whites to continue to rely on mulatto support long after slavery. As long as Blacks were retained in the least remunerative sectors of the secondary labor force—agricultural, industrial, and service laborers—mulattoes settled for token integration into the skilled trades, the petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and primary labor force comprised of white-collar workers.

The Brazilian racial order has thus assured that African Brazilians collectively speaking are denied the privileges of Whites, but mulattoes are at the same time rewarded in proportion to their cultural and phenotypical approximation to the European ideal. The inegalitarian nature of this type of integration is captured in Figure 1.b. Both the grey and black circles are in a subdominant position. However, the

positioning of the grey circle is not only intermediate, and thus comparatively less subdominant than the black circle, but also linked with the dominant white circle due to its closer somatic approximation to the latter. By virtue of this dynamic, select multiracial individuals have been allowed token vertical socioeconomic mobility into the bourgeoisie through an informal window of opportunity that historian Carl Degler calls the “escape hatch.” Degler does not imply that the masses of mulattoes in Brazil gain access *carte blanche* to these prestigious ranks of Whites by virtue of the fact that they are mulatto as opposed to Black. Rather, he argues that the escape hatch is an informal social mechanism by which a few “visibly” multiracial individuals, for reasons of talent, culture, or education, have been allowed vertical socioeconomic mobility into the middle class and with it the rank of situational Whiteness. In its broadest sense, however, the escape hatch is a device that has made it possible for other millions of individuals whose ancestry has included African forbears, but who are phenotypically White, or near-White, to become officially, White. This aspect of the escape hatch indicates that the social construction of Whiteness—as well as the extension of White racial privilege in Brazil—is more inclusive compared to the United States, where the one-drop rule can transform into Black an individual who appears otherwise White.

Black Into White: The Myth of Racial Democracy

Brazil’s history of pervasive miscegenation, and its absence of legalized barriers to equality should not obscure the fact that “White” is synonymous with being superior; “Black” with being inferior. The ruling elite is overwhelmingly of European descent and European in manners. It also has implemented covert and overt forms of discrimination that have kept the African Brazilian masses in a *de facto* subordinate status, both before and after the abolition of slavery. Furthermore, if miscegenation has made the line between Black and White imprecise at best, and became a central tenet in the twentieth-century evolution of Brazil’s concept of racial democracy, racial and cultural blending was not posited on egalitarian integration. In other words, there was not a random blend of European, African, and by

extension, Native American traits, seeking its own “natural” equilibrium. In this scenario equal value would be attached to each of these racial and cultural constituents through a reciprocal *transracial/transcultural* process, which Gilberto Freyre referred to as “metaracial brunettism.” It was rather, a process of inegalitarian integration (or *assimilation* in disguise), an unnatural contest between unequal participants artificially manipulated in order to purify the Brazilian pedigree and culture of its vast accumulation of “inferior” African (and Native American) traits with the goal of *perpetuating* only one: the European.⁶

Some of these attitudes reflect the indigenous toxins of Brazil’s own racial ecology. Nevertheless, this “Whitening” ideology was also part of Brazil’s compromised response to nineteenth-century Europeans and European Americans theories of the evils of miscegenation. In order to understand the seriousness of this matter, consider that by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the majority of Brazilians, despite official claims to the contrary, were de facto *mulato claro* (clear[light]-skinned mulatto), or *claramente mulato* (clearly mulatto) in terms of ancestry and/or phenotype.⁷ Not even the most phenotypically and culturally European individuals of the elite could be certain that their genealogy was free of African ancestry and, therefore, insulated from the stigma of slavery and the “evils” of miscegenation. If miscegenation was the disease, Whitening through miscegenation became the cure. Thus, the Brazilian state encouraged European immigration, particularly from Germany, and passed legislation restricting the immigration of Blacks. This was matched by the tendency of many individuals to seek a spouse more apparently European in culture and physical appearance than themselves, plus the desire to assimilate anything from ideas to cultural artifacts that tasted of Europe, and by extension, the United States. At the same time, the majority of Blacks and mulattoes were excluded de facto from having contact with Whites as equals. This informal inegalitarian pluralism was envisioned as the final solution that eventually would eliminate African Brazilians through the “laissez-faire genocide” of sharply lower levels of education and higher rates of poverty, malnutrition, disease, and infant mortality.⁸

Despite the absence of legalized barriers to equality in Brazil, as compared to the United States, Brazil's image as a racial democracy began to erode under the weight of data compiled in the 1950s by both Brazilian and foreign social scientists. These scholars, most of whom were part of a UNESCO-sponsored project, used the latest research techniques to reveal a complex web of correlations between physical appearance, culture, and class in determining social stratification. Comprehensive data were lacking, and important regional variations existed, and opinions varied on how phenotype might affect future social mobility. There was a general consensus, however, that Brazilians who were phenotypically more African were disproportionately found at the bottom of society in terms of education and occupation.⁹ Journalists soon followed with anecdotal evidence that confirmed the existence of a subtle, yet unmistakable, pattern of racial discrimination in social relations. Discrimination was more complex than in the United States binary racial order and had never been codified since the colonial era. Furthermore, Brazilians could still tout the fact that they had avoided the United States' violent urban uprisings and its distorted White supremacist ideology. Nevertheless, the growing body of evidence not only made the Brazilian elite cautious about discussing their society's race relations, but paradoxically, made the myth of racial democracy an even more crucial official ideology. It was staunchly defended by Brazil's ruling elite, and reinforced by the series of military dictatorships that dominated the Brazilian political scene between 1964 and 1985.¹⁰

During this time period, further research and discussion on the problem of racial inequality was severely censored by claims that no such problem existed. In 1969, this resulted in the "involuntary" retirement of University faculty branded as subversives for doing research on Brazilian race relations. The political machinery of the state also decreed that any efforts to mobilize along racial lines were "racist," "subversive," a threat to national security, and punishable by imprisonment. Individuals who were inclined to organize to address a problem which the state declared did not in fact exist, therefore, were themselves viewed as creating a problem, and accused of having been infected with a contagion

imported from the United States. Many individuals were imprisoned; others became voluntary exiles or were forcibly deported.¹¹ The intense censorship of public discussion on racial issues was paralleled by the fact that no racial data were collected on the 1970 census. The principal reason given for the decision was that previous data had been notoriously unreliable, because definitions of racial category lacked uniformity. In actuality, government officials sought to promote the notion that racial criteria were insignificant in determining the distribution of societal wealth, power, privilege and prestige—and were thus meaningless statistical categories. Part of their strategy for achieving this was to deprive researchers (and therefore the public and politicians) of nationwide figures that would make it possible to document the deplorable conditions endured by African Brazilians in terms of education, jobs, income, and health.¹²

The Black Consciousness Movement

The veil of silence on the discussion of racial inequality in Brazil was raised in the 1970s during the gradual liberalization of the sociopolitical ecology—the *abertura democrática*, or democratic opening. Beginning in 1978, in several major cities (primarily in the industrialized Southeast), African Brazilian activists took advantage of the celebration of the abolition of slavery in May of 1978 to organize protests against police brutality, mistreatment at the hands of public agencies, and an overt act of discrimination in which three African Brazilian youth were barred from a yacht club. None of these events was unusual in and of themselves. Nevertheless, growing covert racial tension, the lifting of authoritarian rule in Brazil, and the Civil Rights movement in the United States, all combined to set the stage for the formation of the Unified Black Movement, the MNU (*O Movimento Negro Unificado*). African Brazilians thus made progress in rekindling the previous militancy that the MNU's predecessor, the Black Front (*A Frente Negra*), had exhibited during the 1930s before having reached its nadir during the repressive dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas (1937–1945).¹³

The MNU's vision of Brazil diverged from the official assimilationist ideology. Activists proposed a mosaic of mutually respectful and differentiated, or dissimilated, if not mutually exclusive, African

Brazilian and European Brazilian racial/cultural centers of reference in the manner of egalitarian pluralism. Both Whites and Blacks would have equal access to all aspects of the public sphere, with the option of integrating in the private sphere in the manner of egalitarian integration. In this case, the selective pattern would be voluntary, rather than mandated by Whites, such that if and when African Brazilians choose to integrate they do so as equals. Nevertheless, the MNU met with hostility from some sectors of the political and cultural establishment. Their goal of achieving a more equitable society by mobilizing an African Brazilian plurality was termed as “un-Brazilian” and a mindless imitation of the United States civil rights movement. Others described the MNU’s tactics as racist in the manner of a reverse type of apartheid.¹⁴

African Brazilian activists received warmer, if somewhat tentative, support from intellectuals, students, progressive sections of the church, and workers committed to political and social change. Many of these individuals, however, have socialist leanings and view African Brazilians as part of a larger transracial proletariat. They considered racism to be an epiphenomenon of class inequality and argue that one automatically addresses the former by addressing the latter. They agreed that the racial prejudice and discrimination directed against African Brazilians has led to gross inequalities in educational, socioeconomic, and political attainment. However, these activists have focused their attention primarily on the poor, the unemployed, and non-literate. They believe that singling out African Brazilians for special treatment would deviate from the main course of social reform.¹⁵

The MNU enjoyed a significant amount of publicity in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but received greater attention from academics abroad than in Brazil. Since its inception it has tended to be dominated by individuals from the urban bourgeoisie, and been plagued by class divisions. These factors have prevented the MNU from garnering broad support from other urban, and (in particular) rural sectors of the African Brazilian community, which remain largely unaware of its existence. Notwithstanding the MNU’s lack of success in gaining broad support for a race-specific political agenda, or organizing a large

race-based electorate in governmental politics, it is, nonetheless, part of a larger Black consciousness movement encompassing various social, cultural, and political organizations and activities. This can be seen in the revitalization of African-derived religious and musical expression, and an upsurge in African Brazilian literature, much of which has been published in modest editions at the authors' expense. Militant African Brazilian action groups have gained the support of the leading national labor confederation and among domestic employees. Prominent African Brazilians (particularly artists and entertainers) have become willing to speak out publicly about their experiences with racial discrimination.¹⁶

The Increasing Significance of Race

The MNU's efforts also have been aided by a new generation of social scientists. These researchers (most of whom are White) not only helped get the race question reinstated on the 1980 census, but also were funded with a grant from the Ford Foundation to provide a rigorous analysis of official data contained in such sources as the 1940, 1950, and 1980 censuses, and the National Household Surveys of the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, they verified glaring disparities in the areas of health, income, and education between Whites, who make up approximately 54 percent of the population, and African Brazilians, who make up approximately 46 percent.¹⁷ For example, analyses of 1980 census data indicate that while overall school attendance has increased for all Brazilians, *preto* and *pardo* children tend to start school later, leave school earlier, and at all ages display a lower probability of attending school. In terms of employment *pretos* and *pardos* are concentrated in less skilled and lower-paying jobs. Moreover, wage differentials persist among *pretos*, *pardos*, and *brancos* even when controlling for education and job experience. These findings underscored the significance of race, quite apart from culture or class, and its role in determining social inequality. More important, they clearly pointed to the fact that, in terms of overall socioeconomic stratification, the racial divide is primarily located between Whites and the African Brazilian masses, and only secondarily between mulattoes and Blacks.

It is true that mulattoes have been able to enter the primary occupational tier as schoolteachers, journalists, artists, clerks, or low-level officials in municipal government and tax offices, and get promoted more easily. They also earn 42% more than their Black counterparts.¹⁸ It is equally true that rates of intermarriage and residential integration among mulattoes and Whites are comparatively higher than between Whites and Blacks, and that the multiracial population does occupy an intermediate position in the Brazilian racial hierarchy.¹⁹ Moreover, the presence of African ancestry in one's genealogy and/or some phenotypically African traits does not preclude a self-identification or social designation as White. Consequently, the credentials distinguishing someone who is White from someone who is multiracial are ambiguous. Nevertheless, Whites earn another 98% more than mulattoes, and the intermediate positioning of the majority of those 40% of Brazilians who are considered multiracial is much closer to Blacks than Whites. For the most part, they are excluded from professions in medicine, law, academia, upper-level government, and the officer and diplomatic corps. Even entry-level jobs in the primary labor force that require a "good appearance," such as receptionists, secretaries, bank tellers, or even minimal authority, such as entry-level federal employees, are effectively closed to the majority of mulattoes. The multiracial population, along with the 6% of African Brazilians who are designated as Black, remain disproportionately concentrated at the bottom of society in the secondary labor force comprised of agricultural and industrial workers, service employees, janitors, porters, laundresses, day laborers, and domestic servants, or in the ranks of the underemployed and unemployed. Moreover, Black and multiracial individuals in the proletariat, as both children and adults, are routinely subjected to police harassment, often resulting in murder.²⁰

Whites and African Brazilians do experience similar disadvantages at the undermost levels of society, which gives credence to the notion that social inequality is based primarily on class. Data indicate, however, that Whites supersede these disadvantages in higher rates of tangible returns in terms of wealth, power, privilege, and prestige once they have made educational gains. Whites are not only seven times

more likely than African Brazilians to be college graduates, but African Brazilian professionals such as physicians, teachers, and engineers also earn 20–25% less than their White counterparts.²¹ Furthermore, if the achievements of individual African Brazilians can be pointed to as examples of meritocracy in action, they also divert attention from the fact that Blacks and mulattoes not only find it more difficult to breaking out of the proletariat, but also suffer increasing disadvantages as their vertical class mobility increases. Whites are more successful at intergenerational transferal of their achieved status given the same starting point. African Brazilians are handicapped by the cumulative disadvantages of previous, as well as persistent, racial discrimination. These factors hamper and erode, if not preclude, their ability to pass on wealth, power, privilege, and prestige from generation to generation. This is due precisely to the superordinate and subordinate ascribed racial status respectively assigned to Whites and African Brazilians.²² These and other findings underscore the significance of race, quite apart from culture or class, and its role in determining social inequality. More important, they point to the fact that, in terms of overall socioeconomic stratification, the racial divide is primarily located between Whites and all “Others”—as is the case in the United States—and only secondarily between the Black and multiracial populations.

White Into Black: Closing the Escape Hatch

Quantifying Racism and the Quality of Life

Previously, discussion on Brazilian race relations relied heavily on “qualitative” data, and was primarily framed in the context of historical and anthropological discourse. Historians focused on laws, traveler’s accounts, memoirs, parliamentary debates, and newspaper articles in which anecdotal accounts remained the standard source of information. They generally neglected researching police and court records, health archives, personnel files, and other sources from which they might have constructed time series. When such sources were consulted, it was generally to study slavery. Historians did not hesitate to draw conclusions about the historical nature of race relations. Yet, they seldom studied contemporary

race relations. Anthropologists generally studied African-derived religious and linguistic systems, and creative expression in the arts. When they did examine race relations, their focus was primarily on the ambiguity and situational nature of racial markers. They provided little analysis of the role that race in determining larger structural issues (e.g. education, income, and occupation).²³

The new generation of sociologists, following in the footsteps of their predecessors in the 1960s, however, has provided activists with the necessary quantitative data to wage their struggle for social change at the level of unions, courts, employers, and the media. Nevertheless, there is no in-depth overview of the post-1976 statistics. Much more data on health, housing, education, family structure, etc., is needed, yet census forms are designed to collect only the most basic information. Furthermore, it has been difficult for researchers to gain access to data already gathered: most of the important information has never been published. The data is available only on tapes, and researchers were denied access to these sources for years. When the tapes were released they were made available only at great expense to users. A group of researchers, in response to these obstructionist procedures, has pressured the Census Bureau to release future data on a timely and accessible basis.²⁴

The 1988 Constitution, for the first time in Brazilian history, outlawed racism, declaring that “the practice of racism constitutes a crime that is unbailable and without statute of limitation and is subject to imprisonment according to the law.”²⁵ Yet, the Preliminary Study Commission on the New Constitution, which was organized in 1985, omitted the names of the three African Brazilians that had been recommended by the recently deceased President Tancredo Neves. Only after vigorous protest by Black organizations was the name of one African Brazilian added. Furthermore, the antiracist article in the Constitution of 1988, like the Afonso Arinos Law of 1951 (which outlawed racial discrimination in public accommodations), is more rhetoric than commitment. Even with the passage of the necessary enabling law (the *Lei Caó*), Brazilian civil rights lawyers found it difficult in practice to establish a legal basis for their criminal complaints.²⁶ There were no African Brazilians on the Ministry of Justice’s 1984

committee to publish five books on the centennial of the abolition of slavery. Although African Brazilians mounted massive public demonstrations against racism during the centennial in the spring of 1988, a barrage of academic papers and civic ceremonies extolling Brazil's genius in having allegedly liquidated slavery without such upheavals as the United States Civil War, largely overshadowed their protests.²⁷

Although Geledés, a São Paulo based nongovernmental organization focusing on the problems of African Brazilian women, pressed at least 62 cases of racial discrimination before the courts, by 1992 only 4 cases had been brought to trial. Governor Franco Montoro in São Paulo (and his successor, Orestes Quércia), and Leonel Brizola during his first term as mayor of Rio de Janeiro, initiated policies to move against racial discrimination. They placed African Brazilians in prominent positions, and respectively created the Council for the Participation and Development of the African Brazilian Community, and prohibited employers from requiring domestics to use separate stairwells and elevators. However, these initiatives were largely undermined by their successors, sometimes blatantly. There has been some discussion of compensatory measures in the manner of affirmative action to ensure African Brazilians equal representation in the public sphere in proportion to their numbers in the population. Such tactics, nevertheless, are viewed with suspicion, or as a form of reverse discrimination, which would aggravate, rather than provide a solution to the problem of racial inequality.²⁸

Black Identity and the Decennial Census

African Brazilian activists, however, regard their battle as only in its preliminary stages. Since 1978, they have sought to awaken more individuals to the fact that Brazil's racial democracy ideology is a myth. Contrary to its egalitarian rhetoric, this ideology has translated into inegalitarian integration (that is, assimilation), for a privileged few multiracial individuals (and some rare Blacks)—who are, thus, coopted into an alliance as “insiders.”²⁹ More important, it has obscured the pervasive inegalitarian pluralism originating in de facto, if not de jure, apartheid that perpetuates gross inequities between Whites and the

African Brazilian masses in the areas of education, jobs, income, and health. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), and more specifically the Department of Social Studies and Indicators within IBGE (the agency responsible for collecting census and other demographic data) fully documented these disparities between Whites (*brancos*) and the African Brazilian masses (*negros*) when it changed its policy in 1980 and began analyzing and publishing racial data in binary form.

The impetus for this seemingly routine decision by a group of government researchers and technocrats appears to have originated to some extent in the IBGE's own analysis of the 1976 and 1980 data. This procedural change was doubtless a response in part to demands made by African Brazilian activists, and similar recommendations made by the new generation of social scientists. Consequently, this change had broad implications. Although IBGE had not abandoned the traditional three-category concept of color (or four, if one includes the category of "yellows," *amarelos*, used to designate individuals of Asian ancestry), it had moved toward a conceptualization of Brazilian race relations in which both the *preto* and *pardo* populations are considered a single racial group.³⁰

Beginning in 1990, African Brazilian organizations, along with nine governmental agencies (including development groups and research centers), gained the support of *Instituto Brasileiro de Análisis Sociais e Económicas* (IBASE) in mounting a joint publicity campaign with funds from the Ford Foundation and *Terra Nuova* (an Italian agency for cooperation), directing all Brazilians to be more "conscientious" in filling out the racial question on the 1990 census. The spirit of the campaign was captured best in its poster and brochure slogan—"Não Deixe sua Côr Passar em Branco. Responda com Bom C/Senso," ("Don't let your color be passed of as White. Respond with good [census] sense). This slogan utilized a play-on-words between census (*censo*) and sense (*senso*) to address the tendency of individuals to identify themselves on previous surveys with a lighter color (racial) category than their "actual" phenotype might warrant. Over time, this process of racial alchemy has led to a "distortion" of

racial demographics. Consequently, Blacks numerically have lost much and gained nothing; multiracial individuals have gained more than they have lost, and Whites have made substantial gains.³¹

The goal of the campaign was to explain the reality behind the myth of racial democracy and get African Brazilians to identify with the concept *negro*, rather than the color codings *preto* and *pardo*, in order to affirm a politicized racial identity. Furthermore, *pardo* includes all possible types of blended backgrounds and therefore was considered so general as to be meaningless. It also stirred controversy because it was a remnant of the racial divisiveness of the past. The census was canceled that year because of problems between the Ministry of the Economy and the Census Bureau. Although the census was finally taken in 1991 strikes by census staff short-circuited dialogue between campaign organizers, the Bureau administrators, and enumerators that potentially would have resulted in changing the wording on the census questionnaire from *branco* (White), *pardo* (multiracial), and *preto* (Black), to reflect the *branco* (White) and *negro* (African Brazilian) distinctions.³²

Census color data were not released until 1995. The percentage of Brazilians who chose black (*preto*) actually decreased slightly, from 5.9% in 1980 to 5% in 1991. Although the black and white percentages have decreased over time, “black” is now a small percentage of the population; “white” remains more than half of it (52%). The percentage of individuals identifying as *pardo* increased from 38.8% in 1980 to 42 % in 1991. Yet, this trend is consistent with previous censuses in which *pardo* percentages have increased. In fact, the data would seem to indicate that the campaign had a negligible significant impact on racial preferences. Consequently, it would probably be an overstatement to attribute the latest increase in the *pardo* category to the census campaign. Indeed, the campaign was constrained by a limited staff and inadequate financial resources. Despite its national aspirations, the campaign activities were largely centered in the city of Rio de Janeiro. It thus remains unknown how the masses of Brazilians would have responded to the campaign’s slogan had they been aware of it . What is clear, however, is that the actual number of individuals that compose the Black consciousness movement is extremely small as compared

to its claimed African Brazilian constituency of approximately 73 million people (half of Brazil's population).³³

Yet, the legitimacy of the movement and its census campaign was not diminished by the final 1990 census count. Rather, the movement was more strongly positioned to influence the 2000 census (although preliminary racial data for the 2000 census are similar to those of the 1990 census). Yet, the current open discussion about census methods within the IBGE and in the media is directly, if not completely, attributable to the campaign. That said, the Black consciousness movement has a difficult task ahead. In order to consolidate its actual and potential constituents into a politically conscious collective subjectivity it will need to persuade vast numbers of individuals who self-identify as *pardo* to view themselves as part of a larger African Brazilian (*negro*) constituency, or even as partners in a common cause with blacks. Claims of representing an African Brazilian majority (or a large plurality) based on census numbers and actually organizing Brazilians into a collective subjectivity as *negros* are entirely separate, if related, tasks.³⁴ (Nobles, 2000). Yet, the activists in the Black consciousness movement in Brazil have been most immediately concerned with encountering and reforming the racial state through the collection of census racial data. This is a logical strategy given the state's role not only in the collection of racial data, but more important, the maintenance of racial categories and thus the formation of identities. By demanding new categories and calling older ones into question, activists forced recognition and discussion of the role the census plays in upholding certain ideas about race and displacing others.³⁵

The Black consciousness movement was unsuccessful in persuading the Census Bureau to use *negro* as an official all-encompassing term in collecting data on either the 1990 or 2000 census. The term carries a particular political connotation and orientation that the racial state does not wish to encourage. Nonetheless, on the 2000 census the IBGE considered retaining the term *pardo*, with a sub-option that would allow Brazilians to acknowledge African ancestry. *Branco*, *preto*, *amarelo*, and *Indigena* (Native American) would all remain. (Traditionally, the indigenous population was listed under the category

pardo. However, it appeared as a separate racial category beginning with the 1990 census.) More important, Brazil's President Henrique Cardoso called upon the IBGE to continue its policy of grouping *pretos*, and *pardos* together as non-whites although this grouping would not appear in actual tabulations. In other words, the IBGE would continue to count by four separate categories, but for the purposes of public presentation and certain statistical work in the presentation of data and some of the cross-tabulations the relevant categories would be whites and non-whites, if not *negro* and *branco*³⁶.

Official Brazilian racial discourse has thus begun to place greater emphasis on the white/nonwhite, if not *branco/negro* designations, in a manner similar to the black/white dichotomy that has characterized the United States racial order. Yet, the African Brazilian majority that the Black consciousness movement claims as its constituency is an abstraction that exists only on paper. In addition, the recent openness to discussions of affirmative action has not been complemented by the necessary legislation and implementation to make it part of official policy. Neither President Cardoso's human rights program and other social policies nor public discussions about affirmative action view the Black consciousness movement's calculated African Brazilian majority as a real majority. There is no discussion on how political, economic, and social benefits might be redistributed to this new African Brazilian majority. Indeed, the full social, economic, and political import of regarding Brazil as a nation with an African Brazilian (*negro*) majority is quite another matter³⁷.

Nonetheless, the Black consciousness movement has been very successful in undermining the image of Brazil as a racial democracy. In fact, this was one of the main motivations behind the census campaign. Political discourse in Brazil is now sprinkled with references to the nation's "racial diversity" (egalitarian pluralism) as compared to the traditional reference to its "racial unity" (egalitarian integration), both of which are inextricably intertwined with census categories. At present it seems unlikely that large numbers of individuals actually will join African Brazilian political organizations. Yet, many more appear willing to embrace the idea of a distinct African Brazilian culture and experience.

Several popular magazines targeting African Brazilians have been launched: *Black People* (its title is in English, the text in Portuguese) appeared in 1993, and *Raça: A Revista dos Negros Brasileiros* (Race: The Magazine of African Brazilians) in late October 1996.³⁸

In addition, the public and political debate has increasingly included discussions about the importance of race, quiet apart from questions of class, in determining social stratification. For example, in June 1995, the influential newspaper *Folha de São Paulo* ran a special Sunday supplement entitled “Racismo cordial: A mais completa análise sobre preconceito de cor no Brasil” (“Cordial Racism: The Most Comprehensive Analysis of Color Prejudice in Brazil”), later published as a book. It was extraordinary in its comprehensiveness and in its bold accusatory tone: the book’s introduction proclaimed “Brazil is a racist country against African Brazilians.” This conclusion was based on data from a *Datafolha* survey that polled 5,000 Brazilians on a various questions including the color terms that Brazilians prefer to their views on the prevalence of racism in the country. However, despite the clear picture the survey data supposedly painted of Brazil’s racist nature, some of it appear contradictory. While 89% of individuals agreed that racism against African Brazilian exists, only 10% stated that they themselves behaved in discriminatory ways. Even more interesting and puzzling, 64% of *pretos* and 84% of *pardos* stated that they personally had never felt discriminated against³⁹.

More relevant, however, are the survey data on self-identification according to color. Researchers found that 39% of individuals self-identified as *branco*, 6% as *pardo*, and 8% as *preto*. Yet, 43% of the respondents self-identified as *moreno* (or brunette), which is a euphemism that can be used to describe a wide variety of “brunette” phenotypes, including those individuals who are designated as *preto*, *pardo*, or *branco* (if the latter have dark hair and eyes). In response to these data *Datafolha* researchers recommended that *pardo* be replaced with *moreno* on census schedules. The use of *moreno* also received qualified support from demographers, who suggested that IBGE conduct further research on the subject. This growing support for a *moreno* category, at least in terms of the census, appears to indicate that Brazil

is moving in the direction of non-whiteness, if not blackness, to some extent seemingly indicating the triumph of Gilberto Freyre's notion of *morenidade* "metaracial brunettism." Yet, IBGE officials have expressed no intention of adopting the term *moreno*, although they admit that *pardo* is, in significant ways, unacceptable. If, however, *moreno* is adopted, the number of individuals self-identifying as "black" and "white" will likely decrease. Brazil would thus have a non-white majority, but not necessarily an African Brazilian majority. Understandably, the terms *moreno* and *morenidade* have met with a lukewarm reception among African Brazilian activists⁴⁰.

Notes

¹ This chapter borrows heavily on my chapters "Multiracial Identity in Brazil and the United States" in *We Are a People: Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity*, eds. Jeffrey Burroughs and Paul R. Spickard (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), "Either Black or White: Race Relations in Contemporary Brazil," in *Latin America: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, G. Verona-Lacey and J. Lopez-Arias, eds. (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), as well as my book *Converging Paths: Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Thousand Oaks, CA.: Altamira Press, A Division of Rowan and Littlefield, forthcoming in 2002).

² *Preto*, *branco*, and *mulato* are used in everyday parlance to refer respectively to Black, White, and multiracial individuals. *Pardo* (which literally means brown) is more of an official term used to refer to multiracial individuals, particularly mulattoes. A vernacular term such as *moreno* (brunette), however, is a euphemism that can be used to describe a wide variety of "brunette" phenotypes, including those individuals who are designated as *preto*, *pardo*, or *branco* (if the latter have dark hair and eyes). The complex issues surrounding multiracial identity in Brazil and the United States are by no means limited to the experience of individuals of African and European descent. Nevertheless, an examination of the history of African slavery and the unique legacy of attitudes and policies that have crystallized around the

experience of individuals of African and European descent in Brazil who are often referred to as mulattoes make is particularly meaningful.

³ This portrayal of Brazil as a racial democracy can be attributed in part to Gilberto Freyre's monumental study of the Brazilian race relations. Some of the most important studies include: Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986); E. Franklin Frazier, "A Comparison of Negro-White Relations in Brazil and the United States," (Originally published 1944), in *African American Reflections on Brazil's Racial Paradise*, ed. David J. Helwig (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 131–136; Gilberto Freyre, *The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization*, trans. Harriet de Onís (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Gilberto Freyre, *The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil*, trans. Harriet de Onís (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963); Gilberto Freyre, *Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic*, trans. and ed. Rod W. Horton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); Marvin Harris, *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. (New York: W. W. Norton: 1963); Donald Pierson, *Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact at Bahia*. (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Thomas A. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Pierre van den Berghe, *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective*. (New York: Wiley, 1967); Thomas A. Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," *Camões Center Quarterly*, 4 (Autumn and Winter, 1992-1993), 49-57; Thomas A. Skidmore, "Toward a Comparative Analysis of Race Relations in the United States and Brazil since Abolition," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 4, 1 (1972), 1-28; Robert Brent Toplin, *Freedom and Prejudice: The Legacy of Slavery in The United States and Brazil*. (Westport Cnn: Greenwood Press, 1981); Charles Wagley, *Race and Class in Rural Brazil*. (Paris: UNESCO, 1963).

⁴ Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1972), 196–199.

⁵. Although the United States racial project has not historically displayed an escape hatch in application in individuals of African ancestry, this device has been variously applied to other individuals whose background has included European ancestry along with a background of color (Native American, Mexican American, Asian American). These policies have varied over time, and have varied depending on the group involved. Generally speaking, however, these individuals have often been able identity as White, even if their European ancestry is one-half of their lineage, and with few exceptions if it is more than one-half. This indicates that social construction of Whiteness in the United States has been inclusive of various backgrounds of color except for African ancestry.

⁶. See Anani Dzidzienyo, *The Position of Blacks in Brazilian Society. Minority Group Rights Reports*, no. 7 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1979), 2–11. See Abdias do Nascimento, *Mixture or Massacre?: Essays on the Genocide of a Black People*. trans. Elisa Larkin Nascimento (State University of New York at Buffalo, Puerto Rican Studies and Research Center, 1979), 74–80. Thomas A. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 64–77. It should be pointed out, however, that Brazilian popular culture and the physiognomy of the Brazilian people remain strongly indebted to and influenced by the African component despite attempts by the elite to ignore and disguise, if not wipe out, its presence.

⁷. See Afrânio Coutinho, “El Fenómeno de Machado de Assis,” *Brasil Kultura*, XIV, 63 (1989), 8_12.

⁸. See David T. Haberly, “Abolitionism in Brazil: Anti-Slavery and Anti-Slave,” *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 9, 2 (1972), 30–46.

⁹. See Thomas A. Skidmore, “Race Relations in Brazil,” *Camões Center Quarterly*, 4 (Autumn and Winter, 1992–1993), 49–57. See Charles H. Wood and José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, *The Demography of Inequality in Brazil*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 135–153.

¹⁰. See Skidmore, “Race Relations in Brazil,” 49–57.

¹¹. Ibid.

¹². See Nascimento, *Mixture or Massacre?*, 79–80. See Peggy Lovell-Webster, “The Myth of Racial Equality: A Study of Race and Morality in Northeast Brazil,” *Latinamericanist*, 22, 2 (May 1987), 1–6.

¹³. See George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888–1988*. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 146–156. See Michael George Hanchard, *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945–1988*. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 104–129. See Michael Mitchell, “Blacks and the Abertura Democrática,” in *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine (Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985), 95–119. Although the Black Front had several successors in the 1940s and 1950s (*Teatro Experimental do Negro, União dos Homens de Côr, Associação Cultural do Negro*), none of these organizations achieved its level of prominence.

¹⁴. See Skidmore, “Race Relations in Brazil,” 49–57.

¹⁵. See Skidmore, “Race Relations in Brazil,” 49–57. See Rebecca Reichman, “Brazil’s Denial of Race,” *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas*, 28, 6 (May/June), 35–42.

¹⁶. See Skidmore, “Race Relations in Brazil,” 49–57. See Lelia González, “The Unified Black Movement: A New Stage in Black Mobilization,” in *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine, 120–134. See Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo*, 211–244. John Burdick, “Brazil’s Black Consciousness Movement,” *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas*, 25, 4 (February 1992), 23–27. See Luiz Silva, “The Black Stream in Brazilian Literature,” *Conexões*, 4, 2 (1992), 12–13.

¹⁷. See Mac Margolis, “The Invisible Issue: Race in Brazil,” *Ford Foundation Report*, 1, 2 (Summer 1992), 3–7. See Reichmann, “Brazil’s Denial of Race,” 35–45. See Regina Domingues, “The Color of a Majority Without Citizenship,” *Conexões: Africa Diaspora Research Project, Michigan State University*, 4, 2 (November 1993), 6–7. See Carlos Hasenbalg, “Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities in Brazil,” in

Race, Class and Power in Brazil, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine, 25–41. See Lovell-Webster, “The Myth of Racial Equality,” 1–6. See Peggy Lovell-Webster and Jeffery Dwyer, “The Cost of Not Being White in Brazil,” *Sociology and Social Research*, 72, 2 (1988), 136–138. See Nelson do Valle Silva, “Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil,” in *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine, 42–55. See Anani Dzidzienho, “Brazil,” in *International Handbook on Race and Race Relations*, ed. Jay A. Sigler (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 23–42.

¹⁸. See Burdick, “Brazil’s Black Consciousness Movement,” 23–27. See Silva, “Updating the Cost,” 42–55.

¹⁹. Much as the United States, the vast majority of marriages in Brazil (approximately 80 percent) are racially endogamous. Although multiracial individuals appear to intermarry with Blacks and Whites in about equal proportions, Black/White intermarriage is comparatively rare. See Carlos A. Hasenbalg, Nelson do Valle Silva and Luiz Claudio Bracelos, “Notas Sobre Miscegenação Racial no Brasil,” *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*, 16 (1989), 189–197. See Edward E. Telles, “Racial Distance and Region in Brazil: Intermarriage in Brazilian Urban Areas,” *Latin American Research Review*, 28, 2 (Spring 1992), 141–162.

²⁰. See Dzidzienho, “Brazil,” 23–42.

²¹. See Burdick, “Brazil’s Black Consciousness Movement,” 23–27. See Hasenbalg, Silva and Bracelos, “Notas Sobre Miscegenação no Brasil,” 189–197. See Hasenbalg, “Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities in Brazil,” in *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine, 25–41. See Laurie Goering, “Beneath Utopian Facade, Brazilians Uncover Racism,” *Chicago Tribune*, (December 20, 1994), 1, 11. See Marlise Simmons, “Brazil’s Blacks Feel Prejudice 100 Years After Slavery’s End,” *New York Times* (May 14, 1988), 1, 6. See Edward E. Telles, “Residential Segregation by Skin Color in Brazil,” *American Sociological Review*, 57, 2 (April 1992), 186–197. See Lovell-Webster & Dwyer, “The Cost of Being NonWhite,” 136–138. See Silva, “Updating the Cost,” 42–55.

²² See Silva, "Updating the Cost," 42–55; Hasenbalg, "Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities," 25–41.

²³ See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 49–57.

²⁴ See Reichmann, "Brazil's Denial of Race," 35–42. See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 49–57.

²⁵ See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 55.

²⁶ See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 49–57. See Hasenbalg, "O Negro nas Vésperas do Centenário," *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos*, 13 (1987), 79–86.

²⁷ See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 49–57. See Hasenbalg, "Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities in Brazil," 25–41. See Reichmann, "Brazil's Denial of Race," 35–42. See Burdick, "Brazil's Black Consciousness Movement," 23–27. See Andrews, *Blacks and Whites*, 218–233.

²⁸ See Andrews, *Blacks and Whites*, 218–233. See Skidmore, "Race Relations in Brazil," 49–57. See Margolis, "The Invisible Issue," 3–7. See Reichmann, "Brazil's Denial of Race," 35–42.

²⁹ The escape hatch allows vertical mobility primarily in terms of phenotypical approximation to the dominant European norm image. However, external characteristics of a cultural and economic nature (e.g., speech, mannerisms, attire, occupation, income, etc.), and psychological factors, such as beliefs, ideals, values, and attitudes are also taken into consideration. Consequently, a few exceptional Blacks have gained vertical mobility in accordance with their socioeconomic and sociocultural, if not phenotypical, approximation to the dominant Whites.

³⁰ See Andrews, *Blacks and Whites*, 250. See Elvira Oliveira, "Dia Nacional da Consciencia Negra," *Nova Escola* (Novembro de 1993), 23–25. See Lori S. Robinson, "The Two Faces of Brazil: A Black Movement Gives Voice to an Invisible Majority," *Emerge* (October 1994), 38–42.

³¹ See Margolis, "The Invisible Issue," 3–7. See Nascimento, *Mixture or Massacre?*, 74–80. See Oliveira, "Dia Nacional," 3–25. See Robinson, "Two Faces of Brazil," 38–42. See Wood and Carvalho, *The Demography of Inequality*, 135–153. See Melissa Nobles, *Shades of citizenship: Race and the Census in*

Modern Politics (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2000). In 1890, pardos comprised 41.4 percent of the population. Their apparent decline from 41.4 percent to 21.2 percent between 1890 and 1940, and the growth of the White population from 43.97 to 63.5 percent during the same period is more related to the massive immigration of Europeans to Brazil than to increased miscegenation or racial self-recoding. Census figures make clear, however, that between 1940 and 1990, the *pardo* population was the country's fastest growing racial group, rising from 21.2 percent to 38.8 percent (+/- 48 million) of the national population. During the same period Whites declined from 63.5 percent to 54.2 percent (+/- 86 million) and *pretos* from 14.6 percent to 5.9 percent (+/- 6 million). See Hasenbalg, Silva, and Bracelos, "Notas Sobre Miscegenação," 189–197. This does indicate a progressive "lightening" of the population. It would be less appropriately described as a Whitening, however, and more as a "browning." If upwardly mobile African Brazilians have been moving out of the *pardo* category into the *branco* category, it, therefore, has not been in numbers sufficient to reverse this trend. See Andrews, *Black and Whites*, 252.

³² See Burdick, "Brazil's Black Consciousness Movement," 23–27. See Domingues, "The Color of a Majority Without Citizenship," 6–7. See Oliveira, "Dia Nacional," 23–25. See Jerry Michael Turner, "Brown into Black: Changing Attitudes of Afro-Brazilian University Students," in *Race, Class and Power in Brazil*, ed. Pierre-Michel Fontaine, 73–94. See Nobles, *Shades of citizenship*, . A significant portion of Whites have African ancestry and display varying degrees of African phenotypical traits. If we were using the Anglo-American rule of hypodescent, multiracial individuals would completely vanish, as would a large portion of Whites. Combining the figures for the approximately 40 percent of Brazilians who are designated as *pardos* with the 6 percent designated as *pretos*, rather than counting them as separate categories, brings the total of African Brazilians (*negros*) to roughly 46 percent. This combined format, by reinforcing a dichotomous racial classification system, not only serves to counter the "Whitening" ideology but also gives a more accurate picture of Brazilian racial dynamics since the

primary divide in terms of social stratification is located between the *branco* and *negro* racial groups and only secondarily—and minimally—between *pardos* and *pretos*.

³³ Nobles, *Shades of citizenship*, .

³⁴ Ibid.,

³⁵ Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), .

³⁶ Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*,

³⁷ Ibid

³⁸ Nobles, ;John Burdick, *Blessed Anastácia: Women, Race, and Popular Christianity in Brazil* (New York: Routledge, 1998), .

³⁹ Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*, .

⁴⁰ Nobles, *Shades of Citizenship*, .